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2 
House Price Dynamics and Bank Herding: European 
Empirical Evidence 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the behavior of residential property and examines the linkages between 
house price dynamics and bank herding behavior. The analysis presents evidence that 
irrational behaviour may have played a significant role in several countries, including; United 
Kingdom, Spain, Denmark, Sweden and Ireland. In addition, we also provide evidence 
indicative of herding behaviour in the European residential mortgage loan market. Granger 
Causality tests indicate that non-fundamentally justified prices dynamics contributed to 
herding by lenders and that this behaviour was a response by the banks as a group to common 
information on residential property assets.  In contrast, in Germany, Portugal and Austria, 
residential property prices were largely explained by fundamentals. Furthermore, these 
countries show no evidence of either irrational price bubbles or herd behaviour in the 
mortgage market. Granger Causality tests indicate that both variables are independent.  
Keywords: House Prices; Mortgages; Price Bubble; Herding Behavior.
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House Price Dynamics and Bank Herding: European 
Empirical Evidence 
 
1: Introduction 
The events of the last decade have focused the attention of both policy makers and 
the media to the housing market. The implications arising from the extreme price 
movements, both upwards and downwards, during the most recent cycle have highlighted 
the importance of residential property in both an economical and financial context. In an 
academic context much of the recent research has considered the interaction of housing 
markets with other key macroeconomic variables (e.g., Campbell & Cocco, 2007; 
Goodhart & Hofmann, 2008; Bjørnland & Jacobsen, 2010). In addition, a large literature 
has explicitly considered whether the price behavior during recent housing booms reflects 
deviations of house prices from fundamentals (e.g., Levin & Wright, 1997; Himmelberg et 
al., 2005; Payne & Waters, 2007; Stevenson, 2008; Brunnermeier & Julliard, 2008; 
Costello et al., 2011). The cyclical behavior of housing is a key issue in understanding the 
behavior of residential property markets as they may reflect herding behavior on the part of 
market participants, caused by factors such as informational cascades, agency problems 
and/or informational inefficiencies (e.g., Baddeley, 2005; Uchida & Nakagawa, 2007; 
Piazzesi & Schneider, 2009; Pierdzioch et al., 2012). 
This paper considers two key issues concerning the behavior and dynamics in the 
European housing markets. Using data for the EU-15 we firstly consider the degree to 
which house prices during the recent cycle diverged from those that could be justified by 
fundamentals. Secondly, we consider whether lenders in these European markets displayed 
herding behaviour and if the dynamics at play in the housing market contributed to this. 
The contribution of the paper arises from the fact that not only have few papers considered 
such a range of European markets but no prior study has analyzed the relationship between 
house price dynamics and herding in the loan market. The results illustrate both the 
linkages between the housing and mortgage markets and the degree of variation across 
markets. In a number of the markets considered, specifically the U.K, Spain, Denmark, 
Sweden and Ireland we present empirical evidence that is supportive of the view that the 
high growth rates observed in house prices prior to 2007 could not be fully attributed to 
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underlying fundamentals. For each of these markets the ‘bubble’ term has a significant 
impact on real house prices, revealing cumulative real growth in excess of 37% during the 
period 1995-2007. Based on the measure proposed by Lakonishok, Schleifer & Vishny 
(1992) (hereinafter referred to as LSV) we test for the presence of herding behavior across 
lenders in the residential mortgage loan market. The LSV herding measure was constructed 
based on the total amount of loans outstanding to five different asset classes of loans by 
each European bank analyzed, from 1995 to 2007. For those countries displaying 
substantial non-fundamental price behavior the LSV herding measure is shown to be 
meaningful and statistically significant. Granger Causality tests are then employed to 
examine the relationships between the house price ‘bubble’ term and the LSV herding 
measure. Significant causal relationships are reported. The results suggest that herding 
behavior was a response by banks, as a group, to common information concerning the 
residential property markets. The variation in country dynamics is clearly illustrated when 
considering the cases of Germany, Portugal and Austria. In these cases residential price 
dynamics can be fully explained by its fundamentals, with no evidence of house price 
bubbles. Furthermore, no evidence is found to support the notion of herding behavior in the 
mortgage market whilst the causality tests indicate that the two variables are independent. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review the relevant and pertinent 
literature on both house price dynamics and herding behavior. Section 3 presents the key 
hypotheses and the research methodology and framework adopted. The empirical results 
are presented in Section 4 and 5, whilst the final section provides concluding comments.  
 
2: Literature Review 
2.1: Housing Price Bubbles 
The concept of an asset bubble is usually associated with the idea of a significant 
and/or abnormal price increase (see Stiglitz, 1990 and O’Hara, 2008). Stiglitz (1990) 
provides an intuitive definition of an asset bubble: “If the reason that the price is high 
today is only because investors believe that the selling price is high tomorrow – when 
fundamental factors do not seem to justify such a price – then a bubble exists.” Therefore, 
if an appreciation in prices is being primarily driven by speculative factors, rather than 
fundamentals, then it may be viewed that housing markets may display the characteristics 
of a bubble. However, merely observing strong or continuous price increases is far from 
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being a sufficient condition for the identification of an asset bubble. Consideration of the 
estimated ‘true’ value that should anchor asset prices is necessary for a comprehensive and 
complete analysis (O'Hara, 2008; Stevenson, 2008). The underlying ‘true’ value is one that 
may be justified by the prevailing fundamentals. In the context of housing markets those 
economic, demographic/social and financial variables that are likely to exert a significant 
influence on both the demand and supply of the asset and therefore prices. Thus, the 
identification of an asset price bubble is effectively looking at price increases that are 
unrelated with fundamentals. 
Generally the literature has attributed the divergence of asset prices from their 
fundamental values to momentum (speculative), intrinsic and explosive bubbles. 
Momentum bubbles are driven by unrealistic expectations – securities that had a long 
record of good news tend to become overpriced and are driven by price alone, whereby 
agents buy after price increases and sell after prices decreases (e.g., De Long et al., 1990 
and Barberis et al., 1998). Such momentum occurs when a price rises or falls and is 
expected to continue to rise or fall and is usually taken as evidence against market 
rationality
1
. As Froot & Obstfeld (1991) point out, intrinsic bubbles derive all of their 
variability from exogenous fundamental variables, and they are capable of generating 
persistent and stable deviations from fundamental prices. In common with explosive 
rational bubbles, intrinsic bubbles rely on bounded rationality and self-fulfilling 
expectations, but such expectations are driven by a non-linear relationship between prices 
and the fundamentals themselves, rather than extraneous or intrinsically irrelevant 
variables that are not part of the market fundamentals, as Diba & Grossman (1988) show. 
Furthermore, unlike explosive rational bubbles, such bubbles do not continuously diverge 
but periodically revert toward their fundamental value.   
A large number of studies have considered whether price behavior that could be 
viewed as bearing the characteristics of a bubble have been present in both national and 
regional/city markets
2
. However, despite the large number of studies there is no definitive 
                                                 
1
 Hence during an “up” market buyers will pile in pushing prices up even further encouraging other buyers to 
do likewise, while in a “down” market price falls lead to falling demand, discouraging buyers as they fear 
prices will fall further, leading to a slowing of demand even further. Giving that housing tends to be demand 
determined over the business cycle (due to relatively high supply constraints) this, along with the 
impediments to arbitrage, can lead to “inefficient” pricing of real estate being perpetuated for relatively long 
and often uncertain periods when compared to financial assets (Fraser et al. 2008). 
2
 See for example Case & Shiller (1989); Abraham & Hendershott (1996) and Miles (2008) for the U.S.; 
Black et al. (2006), for the United Kingdom; Ayuso & Restoy (2006) for the U.K. and Spain; Bourassa et al. 
(2001) and Fraser et al. (2008) for New Zealand; Bourassa & Hendershott (1995) for Australia; Hort (1998) 
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test or a universally fully accepted methodological framework concerning the empirical 
testing for the existence, or not, of a bubble in housing prices. Some authors have analyzed 
trends in price-to-income ratios (e.g., Case and Shiller 2003; Black et al. 2006; Fraser et al. 
2008) or price-to-rent ratios (e.g., Blanchard & Watson 1982; Leamer 2002; Krainer & 
Wei 2004). The rationale in both cases is that the ratios act as a measure of affordability. 
Blanchard & Watson (1982) argue that the price-to-rent ratio must increase over time when 
a growing rational bubble exists in the asset price of housing. Leamer (2002) illustrate the 
parallels in the behavior of the price-to-rent ratio to the price-to-earnings (PE) ratio in 
stocks. Krainer & Wei (2004) argue that the disparity in there being a 30% real increase in 
house prices over 1994-2003 in the U.S. whilst rents have only increased by 10% in real 
terms may suggest an element of overpricing.  
However, these approaches may be considered as being descriptive studies and not 
definitive statistical tests. Wheaton & Nechayev (2006) discuss potential problems with 
using these descriptive measures in identifying a house price bubble and show that increase 
in house price-to-rent ratios may have been caused by increases in house prices, which in 
turn could be caused by increases in home ownership demand. Himmelberg et al. (2005) 
argue that, since differences in expected capital gain from owning homes and as well as 
differences in taxes can lead to substantial variability in the price-to-rent ratios across 
comparison groups, conventional metrics for assessing pricing in the housing market such 
as price-to income or price-to-rent ratios may not reflect accurately the state of housing 
cost, thus, the affordability. Moreover, Stevenson (2008) argues that factors such as equity 
build up can lead to measures such as the price-to-income ratio providing misleading or 
overly simplistic findings. In addition, in markets with high owner-occupancy rates it is 
questionable as to the degree to which a strong relationship exists between the rental and 
sale markets.  
As with any other asset market, house prices are a function of demand and supply. 
Typically, housing demand is driven by factors such disposable income, mortgage interest 
rates and the availability of credit. Demographic and social factors may also play an 
important role as well. The supply of housing is generally modeled as a function of land 
and construction costs and the availability of credit. Price behavior and the dynamics of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
for Sweden and Stevenson (2008) for Ireland. Examples of studies that have considered city level data 
include; Levin and Wright (1997) - London; Roehner (1999) - Paris; Roche (2001) - Dublin; Hui & Yue 
(2006) - Beijing and Shanghai; Shimizu & Nishimura (2007) – Tokyo. 
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asset market for housing will also come into consideration
3
. A larger disposable income, 
greater availability of credit for house ownership and lower mortgage rates would all have 
a positive effect on housing demand. For example, Hendry (1984) expresses real house 
prices in terms of household income, house completions, construction costs and money 
supply
4
. A number of papers have included in their model specifications lagged house 
prices (e.g. Abraham & Hendershott, 1996; Case & Shiller, 2003). The rationale is that 
they may act as an expectations operator as participants in housing markets frequently 
display extrapolative and myopic expectations (Case & Shiller, 1989; Poterba, 1991; 
Malpezzi & Wachter, 2005). In this paper we base our analysis on the asset market 
approach of Meen (1990), in which the price house bubble term is incorporated into the 
empirical model by adding lagged house prices. 
 
2.2: Herding 
The literature on herding has proposed a variety of different definitions. Herding 
can therefore be understood as the behavior of “a group of investors that trade in the same 
direction (buy or sell) for a given period of time” (Nofsinger & Sias, 1999), as “a 
phenomenon in which investors follow the behavior of others investors in the context of 
sequential decision without making use of their own information” (Effinger & Polborn, 
2001), or as a product of “change of agents convictions in order to match more perfectly 
with the opinions publicly expressed by others” (Cote & Sanders, 1997). However, this 
notion of similarity of behavior is not by itself sufficient. Patterns of correlated behavior 
can occur simply by accident or because agents have access to the same sources of 
information, or interpret information in a similar way. Therefore it is necessary to consider 
additional elements of intentionality that can limit the psychological factors such as social 
pressures, social learning, desire of imitation or conformity with a group membership or 
other factors that may result from the particular circumstances of each individual 
(Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003). 
The presence of price cycles in housing markets may reflect the existence of 
herding behavior by agents, caused by informational cascades, agency problems and/or 
informational inefficiencies (e.g., Baddeley, 2005; Uchida & Nakagawa, 2007; Piazzesi & 
                                                 
3
 Examples of papers to have examined considered housing supply include; Spiegel (2001), Riddel (2004), 
Green et al., (2005) and Stevenson & Young (2014).  
4
 See Stevenson (2008) for a comparison of a variety of alternative approaches to modeling fundamentals.  
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Schneider, 2009; Pierdzioch et al., 2012). Keynes (1936) argues that herding may exist due 
to both uncertainty and agents having access to limited information. This therefore leads to 
agents imitating the behavior of others, assuming that the crowd has superior information. 
More recent literature (Banerjee, 1992, Bickhchandani et al., 1992 and Scharfstein and 
Stein, 1990) has developed this idea, noting that there may be incentives for rational agents 
to ignore their own private information when the behavior and actions of others contains 
information that has value. Hirshleifer & Teoh (2003) note that in addition to informational 
cascades, agency problems and informational inefficiencies in the process of individual 
choice, imitation can be caused by behavioral factors, as predicted by models of quasi-
rational or irrational herding. 
The cascade informational model, initially advanced by Banerjee (1992) and 
Bikhchandani et al. (1992), illustrates how information asymmetry can lead uninformed, 
but rational, speculators to converge rapidly in the same direction as the first (few) agents. 
These initial agents therefore determine the choices of those who succeed them. Piazzesi & 
Schneider (2009) develop a model showing how a small number of optimistic investors 
(that designate a "momentum cluster") can have a significant effect on real estate prices 
without having previously purchased a high percentage of housing stock. The authors show 
that this small cluster of owners, who believe that it is time to buy, tends to grow strongly 
at the end of a house price cycle mainly due to increasingly favorable credit conditions. 
When comparing institutional investors with individuals it is important to recognize 
that motivations and therefore explanations may differ. Unlike individual investors, 
institutional investors are subject to regular evaluations about their performance, 
comparisons with respect to a benchmark and/or to other(s) institutions. These 
considerations may lead to institutional investors imitating each other with respect to the 
choices of assets (e.g., Scharfstein & Stein, 1990). Baddeley (2005) notes how there are a 
limited amount of research to have explicitly considered the housing market. This is 
despite informational inefficiency not only being a contributory factor in herding behavior, 
but also being of importance in any analysis of housing markets. Information in housing 
markets tends to be imperfect due not only to the characteristics of the asset (i.e. illiquid, 
heterogenous, supply constrained and high transaction costs) but also due to the absence of 
a centralized market exchanges. Among the different causes for the existence of herding 
behavior by agents in a housing market it is concluded that agents imitation behavior tend 
to be higher or lower depending on the size of a markets informational inefficiency, i.e., 
9 
 
the information asymmetry. However, there tends to be a lower probability for the 
existence of herding behavior among agents when they are subject to less frequent 
performance evaluations. 
Uchida & Nakagawa (2007) emphasize how irrational herding behavior by 
Japanese banks during the house price boom of the late eighties was a major contributory 
factor behind the increase in bad debt following the collapse of the sector in the early 
nineties. In a broader banking context Acharya & Yorulmazer (2007) show how bank 
closure policies tend to suffer from an implicit “too-many-to-fail” problem. This gives 
banks an incentive to herd with respect in lending to a specific sector or in taking 
exposures to a systematic risk factor. This in turn increases the risk that banks may either 
see an increase in defaults at the same time, or at the extreme, fail. Acharya & Yorulmazer 
(2007) show that big banks have an incentive to differentiate themselves, whereas small 
banks have incentives to herd with their larger counterpart banks. 
 
3: Hypotheses and Methodological Framework 
3.1: Research Hypotheses 
The coincidence of cycles in bank credit and property has been extensively 
discussed in the policy-oriented literature (BIS, 2001; Zhu, 2005; IMF, 2008). Among 
others, Hofmann (2004) and Davis & Zhu (2009) find that there is a significant two-way 
dynamic interaction between bank lending and property prices. Others, such as Iacoviello 
(2004, 2005) and Gerlach & Peng (2005) have shown that property prices may influence 
the availability of bank lending via the wealth effect as the increase in house prices raises 
the borrowing capacity of households. On the other hand, the opposite unidirectional 
causality may exist. Bank lending may affect house prices as increases in credit availability 
may expand the demand for what is in a short-run sense, the fixed supply of housing stock 
(e.g. Kindleberger, 1978 and Minsky, 1982). However, irrespective of the direction of the 
interaction it is undeniable that there is a high correlation between credit cycles and house 
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prices, with possible adverse effects on the financial system and on the economy
5
. This is 
especially so given the importance of real estate assets in banks' balance sheets
6
. 
The identification of a housing price bubble requires the comparison between 
housing market prices and its fundamentals. This results in the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Do house prices in EU-15 countries display dynamics not 
explained by fundamentals? 
 
Given that house price behavior in both rising and falling market conditions may 
reflect the presence of herding behavior caused by informational cascades, agency 
problems and/or informational inefficiencies
7
, we assess the extent of herding behavior 
observed across banks. We use the measure proposed by Lakonishok et al. (1992) and 
apply this to the total amount of credit granted by banks to 5 different asset classes. Based 
on the results, we analyze to what extent the banks have deviated from the credit policy 
appropriate given the macroeconomic conditions and collectively increased or decreased 
credit for certain specific assets each year.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Do European banks display herding behavior with respect to 
residential property loans 
 
If herding behavior exists in the mortgage loan market, it is important to analyze 
the direction of the causal relationship between herding behavior and the estimated house 
price bubble term. The direction of the causal relationship between the two variables will 
allow an analysis of whether banks that intentionally (rationally or not) mimic each other 
in terms of their market conduct, do that as response to common and relevant information 
on prices. Uchida & Nakagawa (2007) report that banks are not necessarily presenting 
irrational behavior when the LSV measure indicates the presence of herding. The LSV 
                                                 
5
 See in particular the “disaster myopia” effect (Herring & Wachter, 1999). 
6
 Davis & Zhu (2009) report that real estate assets either directly or indirectly (they are used as a collateral 
when granting others loans) tend to represent about 50% of total banking assets. 
7
 See for example, Baddeley (2005), Uchida & Nakagawa (2007), Piazzesi & Schneider (2009) and 
Pierdzioch et al. (2010). 
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measure may simply reflect an increase or decrease of credit granted based on rational 
factors associated with the specificity of a given industry. Kim & Wei (2002) argue that 
high values may simply reflect the fact that investors are responding to common 
information which is return-relevant. Based on Granger causality tests we consider the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Is there a causal relationship between herding behavior among 
European banks and the house price bubble term? What is the direction of any causal 
relationship observed? 
 
3.2: Asset Market Housing Model 
The model we use to consider the degree to which house price dynamics deviate 
from fundamentals is based upon the “Asset Market Approach” proposed by Buckley & 
Ermisch (1982), Poterba (1984), Meen (1990, 1996), and Breedon & Joyce (1993). In the 
spirit of this model, the problem facing the consumer is to maximize lifetime utility U. 
Assuming a real discount rate r, in continuous time, the lifetime utility is an integral of the 
discounted period utilities, which are a function of housing services (housing stocks H(t)) 
and the consumption of composite non-durable goods C(t): 
𝑈 = ∫ 𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑈(𝐻(𝑡), 𝐶(𝑡))𝑑(𝑡)
∞
0
.                                                     (1) 
Utility is maximized subject to the household’s budget constraint (2) and two 
technical constraints [(3) and (4) below] that describe the evolution of the stock of houses 
H(t) and of the real net non-housing assets A(t), respectively: 
𝑅𝐻𝑃(𝑡)𝑋(𝑡) + 𝑆(𝑡) +  𝐶(𝑡) = (1 − 𝜃)𝑅𝑌(𝑡) +  (1 − 𝜃)𝑖 𝐴(𝑡),             (2) 
?̇?(𝑡) =  𝑋(𝑡) −  𝜕𝐻(𝑡),                                                              (3) 
?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑆(𝑡) −  𝜋𝐴(𝑡),                                                                (4) 
where RHP(t) is the real purchase price of housing, S(t) is real saving net of real new 
loans, RY(t) is the real household income, i is the nominal interest rate at which a 
household can borrow or lend in case of no credit market constraints, θ is the marginal 
household tax rate, π is the inflation rate (constant), δ is the physical depreciation rate on 
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the housing stock and X(t) represents new purchase of dwellings. (
.
) relates to a time 
derivative. 
The first-order solution of the Lagrangian function can be obtained as follows: 
𝑈ℎ
𝑈𝑐
= 𝑅𝐻𝑃(𝑡) [(1 − 𝜃)𝑖 − 𝜋 + 𝛿 − (
𝑅𝐻𝑃̇ (𝑡)
𝑅𝐻𝑃(𝑡)
)].                                      (5) 
Bowden (1978) shows that equation (5) can be written in terms of the unobservable 
market clearing rental price of housing services R(t), as follows: 
𝑅𝐻𝑃(𝑡) =
𝑅(𝑡)
[(1−𝜃)𝑖−𝜋𝑒+𝛿−(
𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑒
𝑅𝐻𝑃(𝑡)
)]
′                                                            (6) 
or equivalently, 
              𝑅𝐻𝑃(𝑡) =
𝑅(𝑡)
[𝑁𝑀𝑅(𝑡)−𝑃𝐻𝐸(𝑡)+𝛿]′
                                                                  (7)  
where e represents the expected value, [PHE(t) = πe + (RHPe/RHP(t))], is the 
expected nominal capital gains, and [NMR(t) = (1-θ)i] is the nominal after tax mortgage 
interest rate. In logarithms, equation (7) can be rewritten as: 
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐻𝑃(𝑡) = 𝑙𝑛𝑅(𝑡) − ln[𝑁𝑀𝑅(𝑡) − 𝑃𝐻𝐸(𝑡) + 𝛿].                                 (8) 
Meen (1990) show that the unobservable real rental price of housing service (R(t)) 
can be represented by its observable determinants, as follows: 
𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑅𝑌, 𝑃𝑂𝑃, 𝐻𝑆, 𝑅𝑀),                                                                       (9) 
where RY is real disposable income, POP is the population, HS is the supply of 
dwellings, and RM is the consumers’ asset wealth. 
In line with Case & Shiller (1989), Abraham & Hendershott (1996) and Bourassa et 
al. (2001), lagged housing prices are incorporated into the price equation. Other similar 
studies that have examined the dynamics of housing prices emphasize the importance of 
including other fundamentals in housing prices forecasts, such as the total amount of credit 
granted (TM) and construction costs (CC). Additionally, a "bubble burster" term (PDEV) 
is incorporated to capture the tendency of actual house prices to converge to their long-run 
equilibrium values. Thus, equations (8) and (9) suggest the following final specification for 
house prices: 
𝑅𝐻𝑃(𝑡) = 𝑓{𝑅𝑌(𝑡), 𝑅𝑀(𝑡), 𝑇𝑀(𝑡), 𝐻𝑆(𝑡), 𝑃𝑂𝑃(𝑡), 𝐶𝐶(𝑡), 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝐻𝑃(𝑡), 𝑃𝐷𝐸𝑉(𝑡)}. 
                                                                                                                               (10) 
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3.3: Lakonishok et al. (1992) Herding Measure 
In order to detect the degree of herding behavior among European banks we use the 
LSV herding measure as proposed by Lakonishok et al. (1992). Suppose that in each year, 
indexed by t, banks have loans outstanding to asset class i. The LSV measure is defined as 
follows: 
𝐿𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = |𝑝(𝑖, 𝑡) − 𝑝(𝑡)| − 𝐴𝐹(𝑖, 𝑡)                                                        (11) 
where: 
𝑝(𝑖, 𝑡) =  
𝐵(𝑖,𝑡)
𝐵(𝑖,𝑡)+𝑆(𝑖,𝑡)
  , and                                                                      (12) 
𝑝(𝑡) =
∑ 𝑝(𝑖,𝑡)𝑛𝑖=1
𝑛
.                                                                                      (13) 
B (i, t) [S (i, t)] is the number of banks that purchase [sells] the asset class i, in year 
t.; p(i,t) is the expected proportion of banks that increase their loans outstanding in asset 
class i in year t, and p(t) is a proxy of expected proportion of banks that increase their 
loans, for all asset classes in a given year, which changes with time. 
The adjustment factor AF(i,t) is given by equation (14):  
𝐴𝐹(𝑖, 𝑡) = 𝐸[|𝑝(𝑖, 𝑡) − 𝑝(𝑡)|],                                                                (14) 
computed under the null hypothesis that there is no herding behavior and taking 
into account that B(i,t) follows a binomial distribution with parameter p=p(t). Under the 
null hypothesis that the investment decisions of banks are independent, the percentage of 
net buyer banks of any asset in the total of active banks follows a binomial distribution. 
We can then calculate the value of AF(i,t) for asset class i in year t starting by considering 
the following known parameters: N(i,t) as the number of banks that increase their loans 
outstanding in asset class i in year t, and p(i,t) is defined as above. 
The null hypothesis postulates that in the absence of herding, the ratio of the banks 
that bought [sold] and the number of banks that are active in the market has the same 
expected value for all asset classes in a given period. Under the null hypothesis, the 
propensity to buy [sell] is constant for any bank and for any asset class in a given year. 
Under the null hypothesis, the probability of a randomly chosen bank is a net buyer [seller] 
of an asset i is then p(t)*[1-e(t)] and therefore, in this case, the value of |p(i,t)-p(t)| equals 
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AF(i,t) and thus LSVi,t = 0. Deviations from p(t) higher than expected, taking into account 
random fluctuations are signals of herding. 
The LSV herding measure is the most frequently-used measures to quantify herding 
behavior among investors. Although alternative herding measures have been proposed 
studies such as Uchida & Nakagawa (2007) note that the LSV measure is more appropriate 
in the specific context of measuring herding between banks. This does not mean that the 
LSV measure is free of limitations. Bikhchandani & Sharma (2001) argue that the measure 
(1) only uses the number of investors that sold or purchased a particular stock, (2) cannot 
identify intertemporal trading patterns, and (3) may not be a good measure unless the time 
interval and the choice of investment category over which the measure is averaged are 
appropriately chosen. Uchida & Nakagawa (2007) report that the use of annual data and 
the focus on a particular type of banks reduces the likelihood of results suffering the biases 
mentioned in (2) and (3). The accuracy of the Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding measure 
rests on two implicit conditions: no short-selling constraints and no conditional propensity 
to buy depending on investors’ initial holding in the stock and liquidity needs. Wylie 
(2005) states that unless both of these conditions are satisfied there is a bias in the LSV 
herding measure. Uchida & Nakagawa (2007) argue that in banking context, it should be 
reasonable to presume that all of these conditions are satisfied.  
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4: Empirical Analysis I – House Price Dynamics, Fundamentals and 
Bubbles 
The quarterly house price data used to estimate the model specified in equation (10) 
was obtained from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The BIS collate house 
price index data for a variety of markets and we selected those indices that are either the 
primary benchmark index for that market or have the longest time series
8
. The explanatory 
variables used consist of real disposable income (RY), real house user cost (RM), real total 
mortgage credit (TM), “building permits” and “new buildings orders” indices as proxies 
for housing supply (HS) and construction costs indices (CC)
 9
. The house price data does 
not extend back to the exact same time period for each country. Where possible we use a 
starting point of Quarter 1 1990. However in a number of cases data availability issues led 
to a curtailed sample
10
. Given our focus upon conditions during the last housing boom our 
analysis stops at the end of 2007. 
The real user cost is defined by the following formula (Hort, 1998): [(1-ti)*i-
πe+th+δ], where, ti is the marginal rate of income tax, in each country, i is the interest rate 
in the interbank money market, πe is the expected inflation rate, approximated by the 
arithmetic mean of the current inflation rate and the previous year inflation rate, th is the 
property tax rate and σ the property depreciation rate. The depreciation rate is calculated 
according to the following formula (Ott, 2006):  σt= [GFCFt – (NCSt – NCSt-1)]/NCSt-1, 
where, GFCF and NCS denote Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Net Fixed Capital Stock 
in the housing sector, respectively
11
.  
The model used to assess the degree to which prices reflect fundamentals requires 
an assumption of a period when the market is in equilibrium
12
. In order to provide a 
                                                 
8
 The detailed information concerning the exact indices used can be obtained from the authors.  
9
 As with the house price data used, the detailed information on the independent variables is available from 
the authors upon request. Initial specifications also included Population as an explanatory variable. However, 
we did not find the existence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between the population and 
housing prices. Hort (1998) argues that such a result may be possibly due to population changes being 
captured in variables such as disposable income. This is because this variable can be obtained by multiplying 
the per capita income and population variables together. Whilst studies such as Stevenson (2008) do find 
demographic variables important they use a per capita income measured and thus avoid a double counting of 
overall demographic effects.  
10
 These were Austria (Q1 1996); France (Q1 1995); Greece (Q1 1995); Luxembourg (Q1 1992); Portugal 
(Q1 1994) and Sweden (Q1 1994). 
11
 Our proxy for the mortgage rate is the 3 month interest rate on the interbank money market. Hofmann 
(2001) for the euro area countries and Hofmann & Mizen (2004) for the UK show that the interbank rate is a 
good proxy. 
12
 See studies such as Abraham & Hendershott (1996), Garcia et al. (2007), and Stevenson (2008). 
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consistent and therefore a somewhat less subjective definition, we use the same method 
adopted by Garcia et al. (2007). The authors, in their analysis of the Spanish market, define 
the equilibrium point as when the direction of real house price movements turned from 
negative to positive. We therefore, for example, use Q2 2000 in the case of Spain and Q2 
1998 for the U.K.
 13
 Unit root tests, in the form of Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, confirm 
that the first differences of all of the variables, dependent and independent, are stationary
14
.  
Table 1 presents a summary of descriptive statistics for real housing prices and the 
explanatory variables. Those countries that display the highest average real house price 
appreciation are Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Sweden and the U.K. There is also a tendency 
for the volatility of house price movements to be high in these markets. However, the mere 
fact that over the sample period these markets have observed high rates of growth, does not 
automatically mean that prices were in excess of fundamentals. Part of the increase in 
prices can be explained by fundamentals. These markets have some of the highest growth 
rates in disposable income, as well as falls in user costs. This justifies the more detailed 
analysis adopted in the paper.  
                                  ____________________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 1 
____________________________________________ 
 
Given the results of Dickey-Fuller unit root test and equations (8), (9) and (10), we 
estimate the following empirical specification of house prices fundamentals: 
∆ ln(𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆ ln(𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑡−1) + 𝛽2∆ ln(𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑡−4) +  𝛽3∆ ln(𝑅𝑌𝑡−1) +
 𝛽4 ∆(𝑅𝑀𝑡−1) +  𝛽5∆ ln(𝑇𝑀𝑡−1) + 𝛽6∆ ln(𝐶𝐶𝑡−1)  +  𝛽7∆ ln(𝐻𝑆𝑡−1) + 𝛽8𝑃𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
                                                                                            (15) 
In equation (15) two lagged real house prices (one and four lags) are included to 
account for housing bubbles in the price equation (Garcia et al., 2007). We adopt the same 
procedure as Abraham & Hendershott (1996) to calculate the “bubble burster” (PDEV). 
Firstly, equation (15) is estimated without including PDEV, with the equilibrium growth 
rate of real price calculated as follows:  
                                                 
13
 The date obtained for each of the 15 markets is available upon request from the authors.  
14
 The complete ADF test results are available from the authors.  
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 ∆ ln(𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑡) =̂ 𝛼 +  𝛽3̂∆ ln(𝑅𝑌𝑡−1) +  𝛽4̂ ∆(𝑅𝑀𝑡−1) +  𝛽5̂∆ ln(𝑇𝑀𝑡−1) +
                          𝛽6̂∆ ln(𝐶𝐶𝑡−1)  +  𝛽7̂∆ ln(𝐻𝑆𝑡−1)                                           (16) 
Then based upon the previously defined equilibrium period we estimate the natural 
logarithm of the equilibrium real house prices. For example, in the case of Spain where Q2 
2000 represents the equilibrium period the calculation of the equilibrium real house prices 
is as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑡̂ =  𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐻𝑃2000:02 + ∑ (∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑙̂ ), 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑡 = 2000: 03, … , 2007: 04,
𝑡
𝑙=2000:02+1
 𝑒 
𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑡̂ =  𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐻𝑃2000:02 − ∑ (∆𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑙̂ ), 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎 𝑡 = 1990: 01, … , 2000: 01.
2000:02−1
𝑙=𝑡
 
                                                                                                                                   (17) 
  
Finally the PDEV term is calculated as follows: 
                                       𝑃𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑡̂ − 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑡,                                  (18) 
 
Equation (15) is then re-estimated with the initial calculation of PDEV included. 
The generated regressors problem is resolved by re-estimating equation (15) and updating 
the computations of PDEV until the percentage change in each estimated coefficient from 
one iteration to the next is less than 0,01%
15
. Table 2 presents the estimation results of 
equation (15) after correcting for autocorrelation through the application of the Newey-
West method. All of Spain, Ireland, UK, Sweden and Denmark, exhibit positive and 
statistically significant coefficients for the first and fourth lags of Δln(RHP) variable. The 
results also suggest that the “bubble burster” has not played a significant role in these 
countries in restoring equilibrium real house prices as the coefficient on the PDEV variable 
is insignificant. The empirical estimates show that the user cost (RM) and real total 
mortgage credit (TM)
 
are statistically significant with the exception of mortgage credit in 
Sweden. In contrast, in Germany, Austria and Portugal, the coefficients for the first and 
fourth lags of Δln(RHP) variable are not statistically significant. In addition, in all of these 
countries the PDEV variable is significant, indicating that it has played an important role 
                                                 
15
 An alternative approach to this procedure is to formally estimate an error-correction specification as done 
in papers such as Malpezzi (1999) and Stevenson (2008).  
18 
 
in restoring equilibrium in real house prices. The results thus show the existence of house 
price behavior that implies the presence of asset price bubbles in Spain, Ireland, UK, 
Denmark and Sweden. In comparison, the empirical evidence for Germany, Austria and 
Portugal reveals an absence of a house price bubble effect and prices that can be explained 
by fundamentals
16
.  
 
                                 ____________________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 2 
_____________________________________________ 
 
In order to study the main characteristics of house price bubbles (∆𝑹𝑯𝑷𝒕
𝒃) and the 
fundamental components of real house prices(∆𝑹𝑯𝑷𝒕
𝒇
), we calculate the growth in each 
component, as follows: 
             ∆ ln(𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑡
𝑏)̂ = 𝛽1̂∆ ln(𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑡−1) + 𝛽2̂∆ ln(𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑡−4) (19)                                 
∆ ln(𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑡
𝑓)̂ = ?̂? + ?̂?3∆ln(𝑅𝑌𝑡−1) + ?̂?4∆(𝑅𝑀𝑡−1) + ?̂?5∆ln(𝑇𝑀𝑡−1) +
                             ?̂?6∆ln(𝐶𝐶𝑡−1) + ?̂?7∆ln(𝐻𝑆𝑡−1)                                                   (20)                                                   
∆𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑡
𝑏̂ = (𝑒(∆ ln(𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑡
𝑏)̂ ) − 1) ∗ 𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑡−1                                                              (21) 
 ∆𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑡
𝑓̂ = (𝑒
(∆ ln(𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑡
𝑓
)
̂
)
− 1) ∗ 𝑅𝐻𝑃𝑡−1                                                            (22) 
 
The growth in real house prices is then accumulated in order to analyze the 
importance of each component during the sample period. Finally, we calculate the market 
fundamentals and the house price bubble based on the accumulated growth obtained in the 
previous step and based upon a real house price of 100, for the initial period of the sample. 
Table 3 and Figure 1 shows the evolution over time and by country of real house prices, its 
market fundamentals and the house price bubble component. The UK, Spain, Denmark, 
Sweden and Ireland are those countries that reveal the existence of a greater bubble 
                                                 
16
 As a robustness test we estimate two alternative specifications. The first re-estimates equation (15): 
omitting real lagged house price growth rates. The second in turn excludes the fundamental explanatory 
variables. The empirical evidence supports the earlier findings. The full results from these specifications are 
available from the authors. 
19 
 
component in the 1995-2007 period. In contrast, Germany, Portugal and Austria have a 
negative bubble during the same sample period. This empirical evidence is supportive of 
Miles & Pillonca (2008) who find that expectations concerning future price appreciation 
played a major role in Belgium, Sweden, Spain, Denmark and the U.K.  
 
                                         ____________________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 3 
_____________________________________________ 
 
                                           ____________________________________________ 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
_____________________________________________ 
 
Maclennan et al. (1998) and Martins et al. (2010), among others, argue that 
countries with less conservative mortgage markets (characterized by higher leverage ratios, 
the possibility of equity extraction and the use of open market value) have institutional 
conditions that would encourage greater house price growth
17
. In Spain, UK and Ireland, 
these institutional characteristics are present and they are also linked to a small rental 
market. These factors further help in explaining why these are the three countries that 
recorded the highest real house price growth in the 1995-2007 period. In contrast, 
Germany and Austria, who observe lower rates of house price appreciation, have high 
transaction costs, low loan-to-value ratios and a smaller owner occupancy rate.  
 
5: Empirical Analysis II – Herding Behavior in the Mortgage Market 
To analyze herding behavior we firstly divide the loans outstanding into five 
different classes of bank assets, namely; (1) sovereign and other government agencies, (2) 
non-financial institutions, (3) financial institutions, (4) residential property loans and (5) 
other classes of bank assets (see, Acharya et al. 2006)
18
. The data was obtained for the 
                                                 
17
 Martins et al. (2010) develop an analysis of clusters which reveals significant differences in terms of 
institutional characteristics across the EU-15 countries. The authors argue that Spain, Ireland, UK, Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland, are those EU-15 countries where there is a less conservative mortgage market, a smaller 
rental market and a generous fiscal system. From Table 3, it is clear that in these countries there has been a 
substantial increase in the weight of mortgage loans to GDP from 1998 to 2007. 
18
 Acharya et al. (2006) decompose banks’ portfolio assets based on exposure to: (1) sovereigns, (2) other 
governmental authorities, (3) nonfinancial corporations, (4) financial institutions, (5) households, (6) other 
20 
 
period 1995-2007 from BANKSCOPE. BANKSCOPE reported, as of the end of 2007, 
balance sheets and income statements for 2,423 banks for the 15 countries we consider in 
this study
19
. Based on this initial sample we select only banks whose specialization is one 
of the following: “commercial banks”, “cooperative banks”, “real estate & "mortgage”, 
“bank holdings & holding companies”, “savings banks” and “investment banks”. This first 
filtration resulted in the loss of 436 banks. Secondly, we delete all banks with less than 
three subsequent years of time series observations or who do not have loans outstanding 
for the five classes of bank assets
20
. The number of banks excluded in this second filtering 
was 1,437 banks in 2007. The final sample was therefore reduced to 550 banks. Figure 2 
shows the percentage of the loans outstanding that were to residential property over the 
sample period.  
 
                                        ____________________________________________ 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
_____________________________________________ 
                                         ____________________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 4 
_____________________________________________ 
 
Table 4 shows the results of for Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding measure for the 
sample means over the five different classes of bank assets and for the residential property 
loan asset class. The calculation of sample means of the LSV herding measure consists of 
the average (for the five classes of bank assets) of the proportion of banks that have 
increased or decreased the loans outstanding amount due to herding behavior. Table 4 also 
shows the p-values, relating to the statistical significance of the herding measures. For both 
LSV herding measures we provide two tests of statistical significance, the t test and the 
                                                                                                                                                    
counterparties. In the present study we merge the first two classes of assets as BANKSCOPE do not 
distinguish between the two in their database. 
19
 Note that in almost all the banks analyzed, there is a breaking of the series concerned due to the change in 
accounting systems from “Local Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)” to “International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)”. Tthere are however, no substantial changes in the data series used in 
this study due to this change. In line with studies such as Lepetit et al. (2008) we exclude the large number of 
small local cooperative banks in Germany, who number more than 1,500. 
20
 For some banks there is no information available on BANKSCOPE about loans outstanding for residential 
property loans. In these situations, we consulted directly the banks’ balance sheets and income statements. 
The IAS14 (replaced by IFRS 8 on January 1, 2008) “Operating Segments” requires that companies disclose 
the main operating segments. Given the importance of loans outstanding for residential property loans on 
banks’ asset portfolio, it is possible by consulting the banks’ balance sheets and income statements to know 
the total amount of loans outstanding for residential property loans. 
21 
 
Chi-square test. Uchida & Nakagawa (2007) report that the chi-square test tends to be 
more suitable in detecting herding behavior in small-samples. Given the small number of 
banks in some of the countries it was decided to present the results of statistical 
significance obtained from both tests. We find different results for the herding behavior 
analysis. While the sample means over the five different classes of bank assets shows no 
statistical significance for most countries and time periods analyzed, the LSV measure for 
the residential property asset class reveals the existence of countries where statistically 
significance is evident. Of specific interest we find evidence of herding behavior in 
markets such as Spain, Ireland, UK, Greece and Denmark. There are all countries in which 
it was illustrated that the house price bubble component assumes a high importance in 
explaining price movements. In contrast, in the cases of Germany, Portugal and Austria, 
whose house prices are predominantly explained by their market fundamentals, the LSV 
herding measure for the residential property loans asset class reveals no statistical 
significance. 
In order to analyze the robustness of the results, we test the hypothesis that the LSV 
measure for the residential property sector is statistically different from the overall LSV 
measure. For the purposes of this test we use a means one-sample t test, the results from 
which are reported in Table 5. The findings report a negative and statistically significant t 
test for the difference between the LSV measure over the five different classes of bank 
assets (sample mean) and the herding measure for the residential sector for Spain, Ireland, 
UK, Greece and Denmark. The results therefore imply that there is enhanced herding 
behavior in residential loans than for other loan sectors. In contrast, in the case of 
Germany, Austria, France, Italy and Portugal, whilst a significant t-statistic is observed, the 
LSV measure for the residential sector is smaller than for other asset classes. For the 
remaining markets (Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden), the 
residential property LSV herding measure is not statistically different from the overall LSV 
measure. The results would appear to indicate that a high level of outstanding loans to 
residential property not only results from institutional factors - less conservative lending 
practices by banks and a generous fiscal system (Maclennan et al., 1998 and Martins et al., 
2010), but also from herding behavior among banks. In turn, this behavior may have 
contributed to the emergence of irrational bubble like behavior in the housing markets in 
Spain, Ireland, the U.K. and Denmark.  
22 
 
The results do not preclude possibility of the presence and/or contribution of 
“disaster myopia” in these countries. This refers to the tendency over time to underestimate 
the probability of low-frequency shocks. Herring & Wachter (1999) report that during the 
ascending phase of a real estate price cycle the subjective probability of collapse in prices 
tends to decrease. This leads to banks taking on greater exposures relative to their capital 
positions. Moreover, customers judged too risky at the previous stage of the cycle, tend to 
get credit more easily in the expansion phase. Consequently, the quality of the loan 
portfolios is likely to deteriorate and become too risky in the mature stage of the cycle and 
the banking system becomes more vulnerable to disaster
21
. Herring & Wachter (1999) 
argue that disaster myopia may not only be exacerbated by competition but it may also be 
related to herding in that banks take on similar exposures, in this to the residential property 
market
22
.  
 
                                         ____________________________________________ 
INSERT TABLE 5 
_____________________________________________ 
 
The final component of the empirical analysis extends the preceding analysis by 
considering the causal relationships present. In order to analyze the rationality of herding 
behavior, correlations and Granger causality tests for the herding measure and housing 
bubble term are estimated. Table 6 reports shows the correlations between the two 
variables while the Granger Causality results are displayed in Table 7. The correlation 
results show the existence of a strong and statistically significant positive correlation 
between herding and bubble measures in Denmark, Spain, Greece, Ireland, the U.K. and 
Sweden. For the remaining countries the correlations are not statistically significant. The 
results also highlight across all 15 countries the lack of statistical significance between the 
overall LSV measure and the house price bubble term. The correlation though is a 
simplistic measure and crucially does not by itself a causal relationship. This is therefore 
why Granger Causality tests are employed to formally examine the causal relationships 
                                                 
21
 See studies such as Demyanyk & Van Hemert (2011) who consider related issues in the context of the U.S. 
subprime crisis. 
22
 The authors also argue that disaster myopia can also affect the supervisory authorities in that they are likely 
to be subject to the same perceptual biases as the banks. 
23 
 
between the LSV herding measure and the house price bubble term. The results are 
reported in Table 7. 
The results interestingly reveal that in no case is their evidence of a significant 
causal relationship from the banks, in terms of herding, to the house market and any non-
fundamental, bubble like, behavior. However, in contrast, for five of the markets there is 
significant evidence of a causal relationship in the direction of bank herding. Of particular 
interest and relevance is that these five markets are Denmark, Spain, Ireland, Sweden and 
the U.K. For the remaining countries of the EU-15, the results show that two variables are 
independent. Our results therefore suggest that for the five markets that observed strong 
house price appreciation, to the extent that it can be argued that a bubble was present, this 
behavior in the housing market led to herding behavior on the part of banks. The finding 
may reflect the fact that banks are responding as a group to common information and that 
this information is return-relevant. However, the findings can also be explained by the fact 
that the choices of banks may be taken as a group, given the “too-many-to-fail” hypothesis 
(Acharya & Yorulmazer, 2007). 
 
                                         ____________________________________________ 
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_____________________________________________ 
 
 
6: Conclusion 
Despite the process of economic convergence and monetary union within he 
Eurozone, there remain significant differences in housing and financial market institutions 
across the different member states of the EU. While in countries like Germany, Portugal 
and Austria movements in house prices seem to be explained by market fundamentals, in 
Spain, UK, Ireland, Denmark and Sweden, much of the house price behavior observed 
during the last cycle can be argued to have been driven by non-fundamental, speculative 
factors. The results presented in this paper reveal the existence of a significant house price 
bubble component bubble in the UK, Spain, Denmark, Sweden and Ireland, where the 
house price bubble component shows an accumulated real growth of 37% between 1998 
and 2007. For this group of countries the LSV herding measure for the residential 
24 
 
mortgage market is shown to be expressive and statistically significant. The results also 
indicate the existence of unilateral Granger Causality from these housing markets to the 
banking sector. In contrast, in markets such as Germany, Portugal and Austria, whose 
house prices are predominantly explained by their market fundamentals, the LSV herding 
measure revealed no statistical significance. For these countries it is not possible to 
establish a Granger causality relationship between herding and house prices. 
The results reported for Spain, Ireland, UK, Sweden and Denmark have important 
implications in terms of economic policy and regulation. Given the importance of the 
mortgage market in these countries and the fact that these countries display less 
conservative mortgage systems it is possible that we observed “disaster myopia”. A 
phenomena, fueled by herding behavior in the loan market, that in a situation of economic 
recession with a decrease in house prices has had have serious consequences for financial 
stability. This situation is further exacerbated in the case of Spain, Ireland and UK, given 
the higher level of owner occupancy and household debt.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Real House Prices and Market Fundamentals 
The table shows the mean, standard deviation and Jarque-Bera test for real house prices and market 
fundamental for each EU-15 countries. The following variables are used in the analysis: real house prices 
indices (RHP), real disposable income (RY), real house user cost (RM), total mortgage credit (TM), 
construction costs indices (CC), and “building permits” or “new buildings orders” indices as a proxy for the 
level of housing supply (HS). The analysis is performed for the first difference of the logarithm of the 
variables, except for RM. The null hypothesis for the Jarque-Bera test is that the data are normally 
distributed. 
a, b, c
 indicate the existence of statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Country  Δln(RHP) Δln(RY) ΔRM Δln(TM) Δln(CC) Δln(HS) 
Austria 
Mean -0.0019 0.0079 -0.0490 0.0209 0.0028 0.0155 
Std. deviation 0.0227 0.0485 0.0030 0.0193 0.0078 0.1498 
Jarque-Bera 0.517 7.676
b 
3.394 17.525
a 
0.152 2.031 
Belgium 
Mean 0.0122 0.0090 -0.0445 0.0089 0.0013 0.0004 
Std. deviation 0.0218 0.0179 0.0754 0.2290 0.1474 0.1400 
Jarque-Bera 0.777 1.747 1.051 1.898 4.052 50.863
a 
Denmark 
Mean 0.0149 0.0100 -0.0786 0.0086 0.0027 -0.0033 
Std. deviation 0.0208 0.0156 0.1434 0.0515 0.0078 0.1664 
Jarque-Bera 0.228 1.550 1.042
 
86.190
a 
0.977 6.513
b 
Finland 
Mean 0.0106 0.0086 -0.0707 0.0139 0.0003 -0.0093 
Std. deviation 0.0473 0.0718 0.0246 0.0677 0.0084 0.1578 
Jarque-Bera 0.323 11.063
a 
1.744 20.935
a 
12.117
a 
42.570
a 
France 
Mean 0.0126 0.0053 -0.0788 0.0153 0.0030 0.0072 
Std. deviation 0.0209 0.0036 0.0382 0.0121 0.0059 0.0853 
Jarque-Bera 3.438 0.273 0.8838 1.262 3.637 123.62
a 
Germany 
Mean -0.0023 0.0078 -0.0005 0.0109 0.0007 -0.0121 
Std. deviation 0.0055 0.0192 0.0141 0.0197 0.0071 0.0971 
Jarque-Bera 3.231 51.389
a 
0.251 11.403
a 
84.545
a 
1.188 
Greece 
Mean 0.0107 0.0111 -0.3021 0.0510 0.0007 0.0086 
Std. deviation 0.0150 0.0049 0.0072 0.0776 0.0078 0.1919 
Jarque-Bera 0.026 22.051
a 
1.4733 16.512
a 
1.598 51.492
a 
Ireland 
Mean 0.0192 0.0103 -0.0823 0.0359 0.0034 0.0175 
Std. deviation 0.0274 0.0178 0.0131 0.1273 0.0154 0.1419 
Jarque-Bera 0.046 2.211 0.0322 31.233
a 
10.915
a 
0.383 
Italy 
Mean 0.0085 0.0095 -0.0613 0.0138 0.0003 0.0126 
Std. deviation 0.0294 0.0275 0.0071 0.0199 0.0095 0.0879 
Jarque-Bera 0.628 13.485
a 
2.155 3.494 24.250
a 
3.413 
Luxembourg 
Mean 0.0098 0.0081 -0.0583 0.0145 -0.0004 0.0010 
Std. deviation 0.0117 0.0153 0.0035 0.1455 0.0062 0.2552 
Jarque-Bera 0.325 0.648 0.761 1.066 1.626 0.138 
Netherlands 
Mean 0.0142 0.0104 -0.0550 0.0221 -0.0002 -0.0014 
Std. deviation 0.0212 0.0173 0.0789 0.0202 0.0083 0.1382 
Jarque-Bera 8.849
b 
10.024
a 
1.300 21.411
a 
4.571
c 
2.557 
Portugal 
Mean 0.0005 0.0126 -0.1355 0.0348 0.0022 -0.0038 
Std. deviation 0.0109 0.0223 0.0038 0.0259 0.0104 0.0702 
Jarque-Bera 2.338 15.715
a 
2.598 4.017
c 
19.152
a 
7.887
b
 
Spain 
Mean 0.0224 0.0115 -0.1359 0.0261 -0.0004 0.0203 
Std. deviation 0.0239 0.0264 0.0753 0.1076 0.0102 0.0973 
Jarque-Bera 2.249 1.519 2.329 9.681
a 
0.074 0.314 
Sweden 
Mean 0.0143 0.0121 -0.0502 0.0311 0.0005 0.0064 
Std. deviation 0.0162 0.0731 0.0161 0.0577 0.0070 0.0309 
Jarque-Bera 1.715 3.793 0.844 21.879
a 
0.877 70.898
a 
United 
Kingdom 
Mean 0.0176 0.0131 -0.0273 0.0269 0.0065 0.0104 
Std. deviation 0.0257 0.0316 0.0593 0.2011 0.0197 0.1035 
Jarque-Bera 0.146 2.333 1.109 0.779 7.728
b 
1.796 
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Table 2: Estimation Results of Real House Price Equation  
The table presents the estimation results of real house price equation (15) for the EU-15 countries. The following variables are used in the analysis: real house prices indices 
(RHP), real disposable income (RY), real house user cost (RM), real total mortgage credit (TM), construction costs indices (CC), and “building permits” or “new buildings 
orders” indices as a proxy for the level of housing supply (HS). PDEV is the bubble burster term. The analysis is performed for the first differences of the logarithm of the 
variables except for RM. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values. RESET is the Ramsey’s regression specification error test. ARCH is the Engle’s Lagrange multiplier test for 
ARCH disturbances. The null hypothesis for the Jarque-Bera test is that the data are normally distributed.
 a, b, c
 indicate the existence of statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. # is the number of observations. 
 Aus Bel Den Finland France Ger Greece Ireland Italy Lux Neth Port Spain Sweden UK 
Constant 0.001 
(0.709) 
0.010
a 
(0.000) 
0.002
 
(0.309) 
0.002 
(0.690) 
0.022
a 
(0.000) 
0.009 
(0.118) 
0.009
c 
(0.051) 
0.010
b 
(0.031) 
0.002 
(0.513) 
0.001 
(0.102) 
0.011
 
(0.151) 
-0.004
b 
(0.029) 
0.002
 
(0.461) 
-1.742
 
(0.278) 
0.001
 
(0.545) 
Δln(RHPt-1) -0.038 (0.821)
 
-0.005 
(0.970)
 
0.813
a 
(0.000)
 
0.193 
(0.423)
 
0.182
c 
(0.087)
 
-0.321 
(0.333)
 
0.464
a 
(0.007)
 
0.228
c 
(0.097)
 
0.346
a 
(0.001)
 
0.235
a 
(0.000)
 
-0.204
 
(0.435)
 
0.121 
(0.605)
 
0.324
b 
(0.023)
 
0.506
a 
(0.000)
 
0.251
c 
(0.066)
 
Δln(RHPt-4) 0.080 (0.546)
 
0.139
c 
(0.089)
 
0.066
 
(0.322)
 
0.198
b 
(0.040)
 
-0.162
 
(0.315)
 
-0.055 
(0.734)
 
-0.090
 
(0.449)
 
0.351
c 
(0.085)
 
-0.082
c 
(0.097)
 
0.163
 
(0.110)
 
0.136
c 
(0.094)
 
0.137
 
(0.352)
 
0.250
b 
(0.050)
 
0.074
 
(0.378)
 
0.252
b 
(0.013)
 
Δln(RYt-1) -0.121
 
(0.231)
 
-0.029
 
(0.704)
 
0.117
c 
(0.098)
 
0.214
 
(0.381)
 
0.091
 
(0.255)
 
0.030
c 
(0.080)
 
0.252
 
(0.183)
 
0.224
c 
(0.080)
 
0.044
 
(0.364)
 
0.007
 
(0.827)
 
0.296
c 
(0.055)
 
0.010
 
(0.973)
 
0.100
c 
(0.094)
 
0.003
 
(0.917)
 
0.129
b 
(0.018)
 
Δ(RMt-1) -0.003
a 
(0.000)
 
-0.002
a 
(0.000)
 
-0.003
a 
(0.000)
 
-0.002
a 
(0.000)
 
-0.003
a 
(0.000)
 
-0.003
a 
(0.000)
 
-0.002
a 
(0.000)
 
-0.002
a 
(0.000)
 
-0.001
a 
(0.000)
 
-0.002
a 
(0.000)
 
-0.004
a 
(0.000)
 
-0.002
a 
(0.000)
 
-0.002
a 
(0.000)
 
-0.002
a 
(0.000)
 
-0.002
a 
(0.000)
 
Δln(TMt-1) -0.076
 
(0.609)
 
0.024
b 
(0.018)
 
0.053
c 
(0.089)
 
0.018
 
(0.795)
 
0.047
b 
(0.027)
 
0.035
 
(0.199)
 
0.005
 
(0.838)
 
0.045
b 
(0.030)
 
0.013
b 
(0.026)
 
-0.006
 
(0.482)
 
0.028
b 
(0.048)
 
0.018
a
 
(0.004)
 
0.043
c 
(0.075)
 
0.004 
(0.863)
 
0.034
a
 
(0.004)
 
Δln(CCt-1) 0.468
 
(0.376)
 
0.004
 
(0.627)
 
-0.065
 
(0.718)
 
0.731
 
(0.237)
 
0.113
 
(0.593)
 
0.062
c 
(0.085)
 
0.727
a 
(0.008)
 
0.096
 
(0.464)
 
0.080
 
(0.576)
 
0.570
a 
(0.003)
 
0.613
c 
(0.078)
 
0.189
 
(0.294)
 
0.215
 
(0.331)
 
0.767
b 
(0.019)
 
0.171
c 
(0.092)
 
Δln(HSt-1) 0.037 (0.267)
 
0.025
b 
(0.014)
 
0.008
 
(0.224)
 
0.018 
(0.438)
 
0.067
b 
(0.020)
 
-0.001 
(0.788)
 
0.002
 
(0.774)
 
0.035
c 
(0.063)
 
-0.026 
(0.308)
 
0.002
 
(0.380)
 
0.018
 
(0.158)
 
0.011
 
(0.456)
 
0.010
 
(0.498)
 
-0.061
c 
(0.053)
 
0.044
b 
(0.029)
 
PDEVt-1 0.059
c 
(0.090)
 
-0.022 
(0.183)
 
-0.004 
(0.910)
 
0.030
 
(0.357)
 
-0.006
 
(0.711)
 
-0.056
b 
(0.021)
 
-0.007 
(0.725)
 
-0.001 
(0.971)
 
0.004
 
(0.723)
 
0.003
 
(0.611)
 
0.016 
(0.704)
 
0.113
b 
(0.045)
 
-0.002 
(0.813)
 
-0.010 
(0.290)
 
-0.005 
(0.562)
 
# 43 67 67 67 47 67 47 67 67 59 67 28 67 51 67 
R
2
Adj. 0.525 0.736 0.788 0.463 0.650 0.451 0.518 0.543 0.678 0.679 0.278 0.550 0.560 0.718 0.664 
RESET 0.500
 
(0.684)
 
0.489
 
(0.691)
 
1.514
 
(0.221)
 
0.571
 
(0.636)
 
0.530
 
(0.667)
 
0.959
 
(0.415)
 
0.468
 
(0.706)
 
0.103
 
(0.957)
 
2.702
c 
(0.071)
 
0.530
 
(0.667)
 
0.302
 
(0.823)
 
1.007
 
(0.420)
 
0.116
 
(0.949)
 
0.748
 
(0.530)
 
0.443
 
(0.722)
 
ARCH 0.090
 
(0.984)
 
0.851
 
(0.498)
 
0.338
 
(0.849)
 
1.553
 
(0.198)
 
0.975
 
(0.439)
 
0.872
 
(0.483)
 
1.929
 
(0.134)
 
0.721
 
(0.581)
 
0.691
 
(0.604)
 
1.338
 
(0.268)
 
0.686
 
(0.607)
 
1.879
 
(0.155)
 
0.522
 
(0.719)
 
1.032
 
(0.401)
 
1.026
 
(0.401)
 
Jarque-Bera 0.978
 
(0.613)
 
0.500
 
(0.778)
 
3.602
 
(0.165)
 
0.383
 
(0.825)
 
0.557
 
(0.756)
 
0.499
 
(0.778)
 
0.634
 
(0.728)
 
0.484
 
(0.784)
 
1.388
 
(0.499) 
4.624
c 
(0.099)
 
2.447
 
(0.294)
 
0.739
 
(0.690)
 
0.169
 
(0.918)
 
5.326
c 
(0.069)
 
2.010
 
(0.366)
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Table 3: Real House Prices and Bubble Term  
The table shows the real house prices growth and the house prices bubble term for two time periods: whole 
period (1995:1 to 2007:4) and temporal window of the last five years (2003:1 to 2007: 4) for EU-15, based 
on equations (19), (20), (21) and (22). For each country and period analysis it is presented the real house 
price growth rate for each temporal period. In the column “Household Debt” comes the weight of mortgage 
loans as a % of GDP, by country in 1998 and 2007. 
Country 
1995:1 to 2007:4  2003:1 to 2007:4   Household Debt
* 
Real House 
Price 
Growth  
(%) 
Bubble Term 
(%) 
Real House 
Price Growth  
(%) 
Bubble Term 
(%) 1995 2007 
Austria -4.99 -0.03 9.09 0.62 13.7% 23.9% 
Belgium 93.07 9.44 50.81 6.33 26.5% 36.8% 
Denmark 81.40 48.22 51.77 33.27 75.0% 92.8% 
Finland 70.26 26.34 43.70 15.15 29.5% 45.7% 
France 83.95 9.66 58.80 5.52 20.0% 34.9% 
Germany -12.23 -18.69 -9.37 -13.03 51.9% 47.7% 
Greece 62.07 27.70 22.40 11.27 6.3% 30.2% 
Ireland 111.52 37.32 32.70 14.47 26.5% 75.3% 
Italy 61.62 14.60 29.40 7.29 7.8% 19.8% 
Luxembourg 74.71 27.69 33.02 24.25 23.3% 38.5% 
Netherlands 72.27 8.94 11.85 2.07 60.8% 98.6% 
Portugal 4.30 -7.80 -4.25 -4.49 36.9% 62.1% 
Spain 117.99 54.87 51.98 31.63 23.8% 61.4% 
Sweden 110.22 46.45 46.64 21.90 44.5% 57.0% 
United Kingdom 146.03 57.22 45.16 23.11 50.6% 86.3% 
*Source: European Mortgage Federation, “Hypostat 2008- A Review of Europe’s Mortgage and Housing 
Markets”, November 2009 
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Table 4: Results of LSV Herding Measure for Loans Outstanding  
The table presents the results of Lakonishok, Schleifer and Vishny (1992) (LSV) herding measure, given by equation (11), for the period 1995-2007 for the EU-15 countries. 
The LSV herding measures are based on the total amount of loans outstanding and weight of loans outstanding to the five different classes of bank assets, which is based on 
the banks’ exposure to: (1) sovereigns and other governmental authorities, (2) nonfinancial corporations, (3) financial institutions, (4) residential property and (5) other 
counterparties (see Acharya et al. 2006). The “LSV Total” column refers to the value of the sample means of LSV herding measures over the five different classes of banks 
assets. The “LSV House” column refers to the residential property loans asset class LSV herding measure. For both LSV herding measures are presented their t-statistic and 
Chi-square statistic p-values. Data were obtained from BANKSCOPE. Only were selected for analysis, banks whose specialization is one of the following: “commercial 
banks”, “cooperative banks”, “real estate & mortgage”, “bank holdings & holding companies”, “savings banks” and “investment banks”. 
Year 
Austria Belgium Denmark 
LSV 
Total 
p-value  LSV 
House 
p-value LSV 
Total 
p-value  LSV 
House 
p-value LSV 
Total 
p-value LSV 
House 
p-value 
t Chi
2 
t Chi
2
 t Chi
2 
t Chi
2 
t Chi
2 
t Chi
2 
1996 0.1251 0.35 0.25 0.0495 0.15 0.45 0.0557 0.37 0.75 0.0107 0.34 0.94 0.0568 0.42 0.51 0.0467 0.21 0.52 
1997 0.0994 0.41 0.26 0.0519 0.18 0.49 0.1240 0.34 0.51 0.0233 0.31 0.87 0.0777 0.45 0.35 -0.0219 0.56 0.75 
1998 0.1232 0.36 0.22 0.0710 0.11 0.34 0.1236 0.37 0.50 0.0803 0.19 0.55 0.1126 0.44 0.13 0.1893 0.00 0.00 
1999 0.0986 0.36 0.37 0.0739 0.10 0.29 0.0793 0.40 0.54 0.0932 0.13 0.44 0.1956 0.51 0.16 0.2593 0.00 0.00 
2000 0.0426 0.42 0.55 0.0502 0.16 0.45 0.1781 0.40 0.17 0.1620 0.03 0.17 0.1714 0.35 0.22 0.2051 0.00 0.00 
2001 0.0715 0.39 0.45 0.0222 0.31 0.76 0.0610 0.42 0.66 -0.0509 0.56 0.67 0.0821 0.39 0.27 0.0994 0.05 0.17 
2002 0.1234 0.36 0.29 0.0579 0.16 0.43 0.1492 0.44 0.33 0.1947 0.03 0.14 0.0803 0.46 0.25 0.1151 0.02 0.08 
2003 0.0332 0.45 0.64 -0.0277 0.60 0.67 0.0816 0.41 0.58 0.1130 0.13 0.39 0.0680 0.40 0.48 0.0162 0.35 0.81 
2004 0.0964 0.40 0.17 0.0738 0.07 0.24 0.1080 0.39 0.40 0.0793 0.15 0.48 0.1330 0.44 0.20 0.2072 0.00 0.00 
2005 0.0677 0.43 0.35 0.0695 0.10 0.29 0.1109 0.43 0.33 0.1029 0.07 0.31 0.1399 0.50 0.17 0.1849 0.00 0.00 
2006 0.0624 0.45 0.42 0.0851 0.07 0.22 0.0865 0.40 0.54 0.1062 0.12 0.39 0.1658 0.58 0.03 0.2166 0.00 0.00 
2007 0.0901 0.43 0.32 0.0735 0.11 0.31 0.1725 0.40 0.29 0.1200 0.08 0.31 0.1263 0.54 0.10 0.1831 0.00 0.00 
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Table 4: Results of LSV Herding Measure for Loans Outstanding (cont.)  
The table presents the results of Lakonishok, Schleifer and Vishny (1992) (LSV) herding measure, given by equation (11), for the period 1995-2007 for the EU-15 countries. 
The LSV herding measures are based on the total amount of loans outstanding and weight of loans outstanding to the five different classes of bank assets, which is based on 
the banks’ exposure to: (1) sovereigns and other governmental authorities, (2) nonfinancial corporations, (3) financial institutions, (4) residential property and (5) other 
counterparties (see Acharya et al. 2006). The “LSV Total” column refers to the value of the sample means of LSV herding measures over the five different classes of banks 
assets. The “LSV House” column refers to the residential property loans asset class LSV herding measure. For both LSV herding measures are presented their t-statistic and 
Chi-square statistic p-values. Data were obtained from BANKSCOPE. Only were selected for analysis, banks whose specialization is one of the following: “commercial 
banks”, “cooperative banks”, “real estate & mortgage”, “bank holdings & holding companies”, “savings banks” and “investment banks”. 
Year 
Finland France Germany 
LSV 
Total 
p-value LSV 
House 
p-value LSV 
Total 
p-value LSV 
House 
p-value LSV 
Total 
p-value LSV 
House 
p-value 
t Chi
2 
t Chi
2
 t Chi
2 
t Chi
2 
t Chi
2 
t Chi
2 
1996 0.0990 0.33 0.54 0.1100 0.20 0.75 0.0967 0.41 0.15 0.0556 0.14 0.34 0.0636 0.48 0.45 0.0241 0.29 0.72 
1997 0.1200 0.29 0.69 0.1000 0.18 0.73 0.0833 0.43 0.21 0.0546 0.14 0.34 0.0580 0.41 0.55 0.0119 0.36 0.86 
1998 0.3667 0.39 0.23 0.4167 0.00 0.09 0.0763 0.34 0.34 0.0449 0.17 0.42 0.1089 0.47 0.29 0.0336 0.25 0.62 
1999 0.1800 0.28 0.38 0.1500 0.00 0.40 0.1009 0.42 0.09 0.0522 0.10 0.27 0.1246 0.33 0.26 0.0920 0.05 0.17 
2000 0.2400 0.28 0.37 0.2000 0.00 0.32 0.1280 0.42 0.09 0.0480 0.15 0.36 0.0874 0.45 0.36 0.0486 0.21 0.52 
2001 0.0960 0.32 0.52 0.1200 0.00 0.41 0.0778 0.44 0.15 0.0459 0.14 0.35 0.0639 0.46 0.49 0.0468 0.22 0.54 
2002 0.1867 0.38 0.35 0.1000 0.16 0.58 0.0830 0.48 0.33 0.0501 0.13 0.32 0.0380 0.43 0.69 0.0731 0.14 0.36 
2003 0.3147 0.48 0.15 0.3933 0.01 0.05 0.0827 0.41 0.19 0.0467 0.14 0.34 0.0716 0.40 0.50 0.0303 0.29 0.69 
2004 0.1013 0.37 0.58 0.2067 0.00 0.21 0.0947 0.41 0.11 0.0475 0.12 0.30 0.0949 0.52 0.27 -0.0456 0.68 0.53 
2005 0.0747 0.35 0.67 0.0733 0.19 0.67 0.0583 0.38 0.34 0.0409 0.13 0.32 0.0759 0.50 0.33 -0.0667 0.78 0.36 
2006 0.2533 0.30 0.36 0.2000 0.06 0.31 0.0729 0.40 0.17 0.0477 0.11 0.28 0.0640 0.45 0.45 0.0686 0.14 0.35 
2007 0.1493 0.36 0.39 0.0133 0.30 0.93 0.0910 0.57 0.15 0.0489 0.12 0.29 0.0380 0.46 0.64 -0.0460 0.69 0.53 
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Table 4: Results of LSV Herding Measure for Loans Outstanding (cont.)  
The table presents the results of Lakonishok, Schleifer and Vishny (1992) (LSV) herding measure, given by equation (11), for the period 1995-2007 for the EU-15 countries. 
The LSV herding measures are based on the total amount of loans outstanding and weight of loans outstanding to the five different classes of bank assets, which is based on 
the banks’ exposure to: (1) sovereigns and other governmental authorities, (2) nonfinancial corporations, (3) financial institutions, (4) residential property and (5) other 
counterparties (see Acharya et al. 2006). The “LSV Total” column refers to the value of the sample means of LSV herding measures over the five different classes of banks 
assets. The “LSV House” column refers to the residential property loans asset class LSV herding measure. For both LSV herding measures are presented their t-statistic and 
Chi-square statistic p-values. Data were obtained from BANKSCOPE. Only were selected for analysis, banks whose specialization is one of the following: “commercial 
banks”, “cooperative banks”, “real estate & mortgage”, “bank holdings & holding companies”, “savings banks” and “investment banks”. 
Year 
Greece Ireland Italy 
LSV 
Total 
p-value LSV 
House 
p-value LSV 
Total 
p-value LSV 
House 
p-value LSV 
Total 
p-value LSV 
House 
p-value 
t Chi
2 
t Chi
2
 t Chi
2 
t Chi
2 
t Chi
2 
t Chi
2 
1996 0.1300 0.36 0.36 0.1500 0.00 0.23 0.1177 0.42 0.45 0.2186 0.00 0.09 0.0974 0.48 0.31 0.0528 0.18 0.47 
1997 0.1120 0.31 0.44 0.1200 0.00 0.24 0.1046 0.40 0.55 0.2217 0.00 0.09 0.1034 0.37 0.42 0.0549 0.17 0.44 
1998 0.0960 0.39 0.36 0.1200 0.00 0.24 0.1106 0.44 0.49 0.2428 0.01 0.09 0.1171 0.42 0.14 0.0503 0.17 0.44 
1999 0.0400 0.36 0.72 0.0000 0.35 1.00 0.0956 0.41 0.55 0.2019 0.00 0.07 0.1305 0.42 0.10 0.0753 0.10 0.26 
2000 0.2182 0.39 0.08 0.1818 0.00 0.12 0.0832 0.44 0.59 0.2080 0.01 0.10 0.1509 0.45 0.14 0.0305 0.27 0.64 
2001 0.2691 0.38 0.09 0.2545 0.00 0.00 0.1385 0.41 0.40 0.2142 0.01 0.09 0.1512 0.38 0.12 0.0800 0.07 0.21 
2002 0.2867 0.45 0.20 0.3500 0.00 0.01 0.1502 0.45 0.33 0.2408 0.01 0.05 0.0898 0.49 0.31 0.0634 0.13 0.33 
2003 0.2277 0.49 0.17 0.2462 0.01 0.01 0.1968 0.41 0.32 0.2492 0.00 0.05 0.1116 0.40 0.20 0.0815 0.07 0.18 
2004 0.2031 0.39 0.33 0.2462 0.01 0.06 0.1023 0.45 0.34 0.1695 0.00 0.09 0.1019 0.54 0.25 0.0467 0.18 0.43 
2005 0.1908 0.42 0.21 0.2615 0.00 0.05 0.0691 0.44 0.56 0.1729 0.00 0.09 0.0990 0.45 0.25 0.0693 0.09 0.24 
2006 0.1736 0.41 0.31 0.2692 0.00 0.02 0.1341 0.40 0.45 0.2229 0.02 0.08 0.0962 0.44 0.31 0.1013 0.03 0.09 
2007 0.2295 0.49 0.15 0.2868 0.00 0.00 0.1381 0.40 0.42 0.2262 0.01 0.08 0.1100 0.49 0.24 0.0650 0.10 0.26 
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Table 4: Results of LSV Herding Measure for Loans Outstanding (cont.)  
The table presents the results of Lakonishok, Schleifer and Vishny (1992) (LSV) herding measure, given by equation (11), for the period 1995-2007 for the EU-15 countries. 
The LSV herding measures are based on the total amount of loans outstanding and weight of loans outstanding to the five different classes of bank assets, which is based on 
the banks’ exposure to: (1) sovereigns and other governmental authorities, (2) nonfinancial corporations, (3) financial institutions, (4) residential property and (5) other 
counterparties (see Acharya et al. 2006). The “LSV Total” column refers to the value of the sample means of LSV herding measures over the five different classes of banks 
assets. The “LSV House” column refers to the residential property loans asset class LSV herding measure. For both LSV herding measures are presented their t-statistic and 
Chi-square statistic p-values. Data were obtained from BANKSCOPE. Only were selected for analysis, banks whose specialization is one of the following: “commercial 
banks”, “cooperative banks”, “real estate & mortgage”, “bank holdings & holding companies”, “savings banks” and “investment banks”. 
Year 
Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal 
LSV 
Total 
p-value LSV 
House 
p-value LSV 
Total 
p-value LSV 
House 
p-value LSV 
Total 
p-value LSV 
House 
p-value 
t Chi
2 
t Chi
2
 t Chi
2 
t Chi
2 
t Chi
2 
t Chi
2 
1996 0.0864 0.39 0.59 -0.0114 0.42 0.93 0.0652 0.41 0.52 0.0814 0.12 0.40 0.0762 0.44 0.62 -0.0119 0.44 0.92 
1997 0.1718 0.28 0.32 0.1159 0.08 0.34 0.0848 0.43 0.40 0.1060 0.07 0.26 0.2057 0.38 0.18 0.1000 0.11 0.38 
1998 0.0867 0.42 0.53 0.0167 0.33 0.88 0.1035 0.36 0.46 0.1098 0.10 0.31 0.2040 0.38 0.21 0.1022 0.13 0.41 
1999 0.1467 0.45 0.24 0.1833 0.00 0.10 0.0747 0.43 0.52 0.0567 0.21 0.56 0.2010 0.41 0.15 0.0821 0.16 0.48 
2000 0.0807 0.38 0.54 0.0530 0.22 0.64 0.0538 0.41 0.59 0.0756 0.13 0.40 0.1277 0.40 0.27 0.0904 0.11 0.38 
2001 0.0752 0.39 0.60 0.0598 0.22 0.63 0.0805 045 0.51 0.0440 0.25 0.65 0.1815 0.41 0.12 0.0966 0.09 0.33 
2002 0.0656 0.39 0.66 0.0803 0.20 0.56 0.1519 0.40 0.23 0.1036 0.11 0.31 0.2453 0.42 0.13 0.0822 0.17 0.47 
2003 0.1142 0.45 0.49 -0.1265 0.74 0.35 0.1271 0.42 0.25 0.0911 0.13 0.36 0.0987 0.48 0.54 -0.0200 0.48 0.85 
2004 0.1108 0.43 0.46 -0.0410 0.51 0.77 0.0531 0.42 0.59 0.0611 0.18 0.49 0.1324 0.43 0.27 0.0844 0.13 0.41 
2005 0.1269 0.44 0.32 0.1943 0.01 0.10 0.0867 0.45 0.36 0.1084 0.07 0.22 0.0773 0.40 0.40 0.0644 0.15 0.47 
2006 0.1029 0.40 0.45 0.0857 0.17 0.51 0.1062 0.40 0.34 0.0885 0.12 0.35 0.1262 0.45 0.33 0.1022 0.10 0.33 
2007 0.1006 0.38 0.48 0.0600 0.22 0.61 0.1002 0.40 0.35 0.0610 0.19 0.51 0.1093 0.35 0.43 0.0044 0.39 0.96 
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Table 4: Results of LSV Herding Measure for Loans Outstanding (cont.)  
The table presents the results of Lakonishok, Schleifer and Vishny (1992) (LSV) herding measure, given by equation (11), for the period 1995-2007 for the EU-15 countries. 
The LSV herding measures are based on the total amount of loans outstanding and weight of loans outstanding to the five different classes of bank assets, which is based on 
the banks’ exposure to: (1) sovereigns and other governmental authorities, (2) nonfinancial corporations, (3) financial institutions, (4) residential property and (5) other 
counterparties (see Acharya et al. 2006). The “LSV Total” column refers to the value of the sample means of LSV herding measures over the five different classes of banks 
assets. The “LSV House” column refers to the residential property loans asset class LSV herding measure. For both LSV herding measures are presented their t-statistic and 
Chi-square statistic p-values. Data were obtained from BANKSCOPE. Only were selected for analysis, banks whose specialization is one of the following: “commercial 
banks”, “cooperative banks”, “real estate & mortgage”, “bank holdings & holding companies”, “savings banks” and “investment banks”. 
Year 
Spain Sweden United Kingdom 
LSV 
Total 
p-value LSV 
House 
p-value LSV 
Total 
p-value LSV 
House 
p-value LSV 
Total 
p-value LSV 
House 
p-value 
t Chi
2 
t Chi
2
 t Chi
2 
t Chi
2 
t Chi
2 
t Chi
2 
1996 0.1263 0.35 0.35 0.1484 0.00 0.01 0.2107 0.41 0.38 -0.3200 0.89 0.10 0.1037 0.45 0.17 0.1332 0.00 0.01 
1997 0.1798 0.49 0.19 0.2248 0.00 0.00 0.2590 0.40 0.23 0.1762 0.07 0.32 0.1669 0.51 0.16 0.1797 0.00 0.00 
1998 0.1948 0.48 0.19 0.2404 0.00 0.00 0.1219 0.42 0.59 -0.1333 0.66 0.44 0.0874 0.54 0.29 0.1752 0.00 0.00 
1999 0.2006 0.38 0.36 0.2478 0.00 0.00 0.2933 0.37 0.12 0.2444 0.00 0.09 0.0859 0.40 0.06 0.1771 0.00 0.02 
2000 0.2177 0.40 0.00 0.1956 0.00 0.00 0.2188 0.39 0.20 0.1682 0.03 0.18 0.0898 0.49 0.24 0.1093 0.01 0.03 
2001 0.2138 0.40 0.00 0.1851 0.00 0.00 0.0752 0.40 0.62 0.0727 0.21 0.61 0.0851 0.52 0.20 0.1022 0.01 0.04 
2002 0.2335 0.40 0.00 0.2005 0.00 0.00 0.2161 0.41 0.15 0.1529 0.06 0.23 0.0282 0.46 0.68 -0.0164 0.56 0.79 
2003 0.2284 0.40 0.00 0.2145 0.00 0.00 0.0638 0.40 0.65 0.0405 0.28 0.73 0.0675 0.41 0.50 0.0434 0.20 0.48 
2004 0.1069 0.53 0.15 0.1908 0.00 0.00 0.2299 0.41 0.10 0.2126 0.01 0.07 0.0644 0.53 0.15 0.1553 0.00 0.00 
2005 0.0816 0.47 0.21 0.1061 0.00 0.02 0.1060 0.43 0.43 0.1633 0.04 0.17 0.0621 0.48 0.29 0.0967 0.02 0.07 
2006 0.1253 0.56 0.06 0.1709 0.00 0.00 0.1257 0.45 0.27 0.1592 0.02 0.13 0.1256 0.39 0.33 0.2060 0.00 0.00 
2007 0.1838 0.54 0.10 0.2298 0.00 0.00 0.1087 0.38 0.45 0.0794 0.17 0.50 0.0590 0.47 0.48 -0.0456 0.73 0.47 
40 
 
Table 5: One-Sample t Test Results 
The table presents the results of the t-statistic for the difference between the LSV herding measure over the 
five different classes of bank assets (sample mean) and the LSV herding measure for the residential property 
loans over the period, by country. For this purpose is computed the means one-sample t test for the LSV 
herding measures. “LSV Total” refers to the value of the sample mean of LSV herding measure over the five 
different classes of bank assets. “LSV House” refers to the LSV herding measure for the residential property 
loans. p-values of means one-sample t test are presented in last column .
 a, b, c
 indicate the existence of 
statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Country 
t-test 
LSV Total – LSV House 
p-value 
Austria 0.0319 0.005a 
Belgium 0.0246 0.118 
Denmark -0.0203 0.083c 
Finland 0.0091 0.652 
France 0.0386 0.000a 
Germany 0.0515 0.006a 
Greece -0.0258 0.059c 
Ireland -0.0956 0.000a 
Italy 0.0490 0.000a 
Luxembourg 0.0498 0.105 
Netherlands 0.0084 0.307 
Portugal 0.0840 0.000a 
Spain -0.0418 0.039b 
Sweden 0.0856 0.1215 
United Kingdom -0.0310 0.042b 
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Table 6: Correlations between Herding Measures and House Price Bubble Term 
The table shows the correlations between Lakonishok, Schleifer and Vishny (1992) herding measures over 
the five different classes of bank assets (sample mean) and for the residential property loans and the house 
price bubble term over the period 1995 to 2007, for EU-15 countries. “Bubble” refers to the house price 
bubble term. “LSV Total” refers to the value of LSV herding measures over the five different classes of bank 
assets (sample mean). “LSV House” refers to the value of LSV herding measures for the residential property 
loans. In parentheses are presented the values of t-statistic. 
a, b, c
 indicate the existence of statistical 
significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Country Bubble vs LSV House Bubble vs LSV Total 
Austria -0.3042 
(-0.903) 
-0.3721 
(-1.133) 
Belgium 0.2181 
(0.707) 
-0.0789 
(-0.250) 
Denmark 0.6757b 
(2.898) 
0.2088 
(0.675) 
Finland 0.2894 
(0.956) 
0.2552 
(0.834) 
France 0.4450 
(1.491) 
0.0376 
(0.112) 
Germany 0.2209 
(0.716) 
0.1254 
(0.399) 
Greece 0.5823c 
(0.058) 
0.0079 
(0.023) 
Ireland 0.7274a 
(3.353) 
-0.3688 
(-1.255) 
Italy 0.2178 
(0.706) 
0.2552 
(0.834) 
Luxembourg 0.1643 
(0.527) 
-0.0977 
(-0.311) 
Netherlands -0.1476 
(-0.472) 
-0.4699 
(-1.677) 
Portugal 0.2298 
(0.746) 
-0.2418 
(-0.788) 
Spain 0.6887b 
(3.004) 
-0.0917 
(-0.291) 
Sweden 0.5075c 
(0.092) 
0.0861 
(0.790) 
United Kingdom 0.8269a 
(4.649) 
-0.4498 
(-1.592) 
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Table 7: Granger Causality Tests 
The table shows the Granger Causality Tests results between the herding measure of Lakonishok, Schleifer 
and Vishny (1992) for the residential property loans and the house price bubble term over the period 1995 to 
2007, for EU-15 countries. “Bubble” refers to the house price bubble term. “LSV House” refers to the value 
of LSV herding measures for the residential property loans. X => Y means the null hypothesis that X does 
not Granger causes Y. Y means the rejection of the null hypothesis and N means the acceptance of the null 
hypothesis. For each country is given the respective p-values of the F-statistic test. In the last column of the 
table come the Granger causality tests results obtained for each country. 
Country 
Bubble => LSV House LSV House => Bubble 
Granger 
Causality F-Statistic p-value Result F-Statistic p-value Result 
Austria 2.0739 0.272 N 2.4785 0.232 N Independence 
Belgium 1.0063 0.429 N 0.1209 0.888 N Independence 
Denmark 14.7351 0.064 Y 1.6315 0.401 N Bubble => LSV 
House 
Finland 0.2604 0.781 N 0.6140 0.577 N Independence 
France 0.9880 0.448 N 1.2790 0.372 N Independence 
Germany 0.7153 0.533 N 0.6719 0.552 N Independence 
Greece 0.7707 0.521 N 0.1631 0.854 N Independence 
Ireland 19.3250 0.031 Y 0.1303 0.881 N Bubble => LSV 
House 
Italy 0.5304 0.618 N 0.1206 0.889 N Independence 
Luxembourg 0.5867 0.590 N 2.4828 0.178 N Independence 
Netherlands 0.6353 0.567 N 0.6012 0.584 N Independence 
Portugal 0.6376 0.567 N 0.4636 0.654 N Independence 
Spain 16.2168 0.058 Y 1.0411 0.524 N Bubble => LSV 
House 
Sweden 45.0882 0.021 Y 2.6607 0.285 N 
Bubble => LSV 
House 
United Kingdom 15.3283 0.060 Y 0.8002 0.500 N Bubble => LSV 
House 
Global 3.2472 0.042 Y 1.415 0.246 N Bubble => LSV 
House 
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Figure 1: Real House Prices, Market Fundamentals and Bubble Term 
The following graphs show the real house price movements, the house price market fundamentals and the house price bubble term, for the EU-15 countries, based on 
equations (19), (20), (21) and (22). For each country are presented two charts: one with the quarterly growth in real house prices and its two components (fundamentals and 
bubble terms) and another with the accumulated growth in real house prices and its two components. 
1. Austria 
  
2. Belgium 
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Figure 1: Real House Prices, Market Fundamentals and Bubble Term (cont.) 
The following graphs show the real house price movements, the house price market fundamentals and the house price bubble term, for the EU-15 countries, based on 
equations (19), (20), (21) and (22). For each country are presented two charts: one with the quarterly growth in real house prices and its two components (fundamentals and 
bubble terms) and another with the accumulated growth in real house prices and its two components. 
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Figure 1: Real House Prices, Market Fundamentals and Bubble Term (cont.) 
The following graphs show the real house price movements, the house price market fundamentals and the house price bubble term, for the EU-15 countries, based on 
equations (19), (20), (21) and (22). For each country are presented two charts: one with the quarterly growth in real house prices and its two components (fundamentals and 
bubble terms) and another with the accumulated growth in real house prices and its two components. 
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Figure 1: Real House Prices, Market Fundamentals and Bubble Term (cont.) 
The following graphs show the real house price movements, the house price market fundamentals and the house price bubble term, for the EU-15 countries, based on 
equations (19), (20), (21) and (22). For each country are presented two charts: one with the quarterly growth in real house prices and its two components (fundamentals and 
bubble terms) and another with the accumulated growth in real house prices and its two components. 
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Figure 1: Real House Prices, Market Fundamentals and Bubble Term (cont.) 
The following graphs show the real house price movements, the house price market fundamentals and the house price bubble term, for the EU-15 countries, based on 
equations (19), (20), (21) and (22). For each country are presented two charts: one with the quarterly growth in real house prices and its two components (fundamentals and 
bubble terms) and another with the accumulated growth in real house prices and its two components. 
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Figure 1: Real House Prices, Market Fundamentals and Bubble Term (cont.) 
The following graphs show the real house price movements, the house price market fundamentals and the house price bubble term, for the EU-15 countries, based on 
equations (19), (20), (21) and (22). For each country are presented two charts: one with the quarterly growth in real house prices and its two components (fundamentals and 
bubble terms) and another with the accumulated growth in real house prices and its two components. 
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Figure 1: Real House Prices, Market Fundamentals and Bubble Term (cont.) 
The following graphs show the real house price movements, the house price market fundamentals and the house price bubble term, for the EU-15 countries, based on 
equations (19), (20), (21) and (22). For each country are presented two charts: one with the quarterly growth in real house prices and its two components (fundamentals and 
bubble terms) and another with the accumulated growth in real house prices and its two components. 
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Figure 1: Real House Prices, Market Fundamentals and Bubble Term (cont.) 
The following graphs show the real house price movements, the house price market fundamentals and the house price bubble term, for the EU-15 countries, based on 
equations (19), (20), (21) and (22). For each country are presented two charts: one with the quarterly growth in real house prices and its two components (fundamentals and 
bubble terms) and another with the accumulated growth in real house prices and its two components. 
15. United Kingdom 
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Figure 2: Percentage of Outstanding Loans to Residential Property 
The following graph shows the percentage of outstanding loans to residential property over the sample period (1995-2007), by country. The series was obtained from national 
central banks and ECB – “Oustanding stock of housing lending” databases. 
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